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ince December of last year, the European Central Bank (ECB) has injected massive 
amounts of liquidity into the eurozone banking system. There can be little doubt that 
these injections were necessary to save Europe’s banking system. In addition, these 
lender-of-last-resort operations were instrumental in stabilising the government bond 
markets in the eurozone. Yet it can now be said that they were ill-designed, making it likely 
that the ECB will have to discontinue these operations. 
What went wrong in the way the ECB designed its lender-of-last-resort operations? It is 
important to keep in mind that the present crisis in the banking system is almost exclusively 
caused by the sovereign debt crisis that emerged in early 2010. After the insolvency of the 
Greek sovereign was exposed, investors were caught by panic and started to sell the 
sovereign bonds of other ‘peripheral’ countries. These countries were solvent, but they were 
caught in a liquidity crisis by the massive bond sales which led to a collapse of bond prices 
and sky-high interest rates. Since most of the sovereign bonds were held by eurozone banks, 
the sovereign debt crisis turned into a banking crisis.  
The ECB chose not to intervene at the source of the problem – the sovereign bond markets – 
and thereby allowed the crisis to become a banking crisis. And when the latter emerged, it 
delegated the power to buy government bonds to the banks, trusting they would buy these 
bonds. But the banks themselves were and still are in a state of fear. 
The decision of the ECB to delegate the decision to buy government bonds to panicked 
bankers has three unfortunate consequences that will become clear now that the central bank 
has completed its second liquidity injection. The first consequence is that the banks 
channeled only a fraction of the liquidity they obtained from the ECB into the government 
bond markets. As a result, the ECB had to pour much more liquidity into the system than if it 
had decided to intervene itself in the government bond markets. If the banks used only half 
of the liquidity to buy government bonds, the ECB had to create two euros to make sure that 
one euro would find its way into the sovereign bond market.  
Second, new waves of panic may grip the bankers again, leading them to massively sell off 
government bonds. The risk that this may happen undermines the credibility of the whole 
operation, and can quickly lead to a new crisis in the government bond markets. Will the 
ECB then again increase its lending to these banks in the hope that frightened bankers will 
resume their purchases of government bonds? 
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Third, and most importantly, the massive liquidity injections in the banking system create 
moral hazard problems that are more dangerous than those resulting from direct 
intervention in the sovereign bond markets. Banks are now given unlimited sources of 
funding to make easy profits. This reduces their incentives to restructure their balance sheets 
that will make them more resilient in the future. True when the ECB intervenes directly in 
the government bond markets, moral hazard risk is created because governments may have 
less incentive to reduce budget deficits. This risk, however, has been reduced significantly in 
the new institutional environment that gives considerable power to the European 
Commission to impose austerity programmes – a power the European Commission has 
happily embraced to impose excessive austerity in the eurozone and to drive it into 
recession. 
The ECB’s LTRO (longer-term refinancing operation, announced in December 2011) has 
relieved the pressure in the sovereign debt markets of the eurozone. But this is only 
temporary. The peripheral eurozone countries are now pushed into a deep recession that 
will exacerbate their fiscal problems and will create renewed distrust in financial markets. As 
a result, the sovereign debt crisis will explode again, forcing the ECB to make hard choices. 
Either it will stick to its indirect LTRO approach giving cheap money to trembling banks 
with all the problems this entails. Or the ECB will become pragmatic and intervene directly 
with a steady hand in the government bond markets.  
It is often said that Germany will never accept such direct interventions. Today this German 
opposition is difficult to overcome, and explains why the ECB reverted to the indirect LTRO-
programme. But what is politically impossible today may in the end be accepted when it 
becomes obvious that direct intervention is the only way to safe the eurozone. It would help 
if the German opponents liberate themselves from the dogma that it is a sin to create 
liquidity to buy government bonds when these bonds appear on the ECB’s balance sheet, 
while the same operation is viewed as virtuous when these bonds appear on the balance 
sheets of banks.  
 
 
 
